Comp 790-184: Hardware Security and Side-Channels

Lecture 4: Side-Channel Defenses

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Slides adapted from Mengjia Yan (shd.mit.edu)

Outline

- How to mitigate side-channel attacks
- Non-interference property
- Constant-time programming
- Constant-time under speculation

Attack Examples

Example #1: termination time vulnerability

```
def check_password(input):

  size = len(password);

  for i in range(0,size):
    if (input [i] == password[i]):
      return ("error");


  return ("success");
```

Example #2: RSA cache vulnerability

```
for i = n-1 to 0 do
  r = sqr(r)
  r  = r mod n
  if e_i == 1 then
    r = mul(r, b)
    r  = r mod n
  end
end
```

Example #3: Meltdown

```
……
Ld1: uint8_t secret = *kernel_address;
Ld2: unit8_t dummy = probe_array[secret*64];
```

Who to blame? Who should fix the problem?

Break SW and HW Contract



Software



Hardware

Instruction Set Architecture (ISA)

The contract for functional correctness.

Software Developer's Problem



Software developers:

- Need to write software for devices with unknown design details.
- How can I know whether the program is secure running on different devices?







Hardware Designer's Problem





Hardware designer:

- Need to design processors for arbitrary programs.
- How to describe what kind of programs can run securely on my device?

Example: Termination Time Vulnerability

- How can we fix this?

```
def check_password(input):

  size = len(password);

  for i in range(0,size):
    if (input [i] != password[i]):
      return ("error");


  return (“success”);
```

Make the computation time **independent** from the secret (password)

Non-Interference Example



- Intuitively: not affecting
- Any sequence of **low** inputs will produce the same **low** outputs, regardless of what the **high** level inputs are.

Non-Interference: A Formal Definition

- The definition of noninterference for a deterministic program P

$$\forall\, \mathrm{M1}, \mathrm{M2}$$

$$\mathrm{M1}_{\mathrm{L}} = \mathrm{M2}_{\mathrm{L}} \quad \wedge \quad (\mathrm{M1}, \mathrm{P}) \rightarrow^{*} \mathrm{M1}' \quad \wedge \quad (\mathrm{M2}, \mathrm{P}) \rightarrow^{*} \mathrm{M2}'$$

$$\Longrightarrow \quad \mathrm{M1_L}' = \mathrm{M2_L}'$$

Non-Interference for Side Channels

- The definition of noninterference for a deterministic program P

$$\forall\, \mathrm{M1}, \mathrm{M2}$$

$$\mathrm{M1}_{\mathrm{L}} = \mathrm{M2}_{\mathrm{L}} \quad \wedge \quad (\mathrm{M1}, \mathrm{P}) \xrightarrow{\mathrm{O1}}{}^{*}\, \mathrm{M1}' \quad \wedge \quad (\mathrm{M2}, \mathrm{P}) \xrightarrow{\mathrm{O2}}{}^{*}\, \mathrm{M2}'$$

$$\Longrightarrow \quad \mathrm{O1}{=}\mathrm{O2}$$

What should be included in the observation trace?

Understanding the Property

$$\forall\, M1, M2, P$$

$$M1_L = M2_L \;\wedge\; (M1, P) \xrightarrow{O1}{}^{*} M1' \;\wedge\; (M2, P) \xrightarrow{O2}{}^{*} M2'$$

$$\Longrightarrow \quad O1 = O2$$

```
def check_password(input):

  size = len(password);

  for i in range(0,size):
    if (input [i] == password[i]):
      return ("error");


  return ("success");
```

Consider input as part of M

- What is M_L ?
- What is M_H ?
- What is O ?

Constant-Time Programming

- For any secret values, a program always takes the same amount of time for the same input when executing on the same machine, and this holds for arbitrary inputs.

Data-oblivious/Constant-time programming

- How do we deal with conditional branches/jumps?
- How do we deal with memory accesses?
- How do we deal with arithmetic operations: division, shift/rotation, multiplication?



For details on real-world constant-time crypto, check this out:
https://www.bearssl.org/constanttime.html

```
def check_password(input):

  size = len(password);

  for i in range(0,size):
    if (input [i] != password[i]):
      return ("error");


  return (“success”);
```

```
def check_password(input):

  size = len(password);
  dontmatch = false;
  for i in range(0,size):
    if (input [i] != password[i]):
      dontmatch = true;

return dontmatch;
```

```
def check_password(input):

  size = len(password);
  dontmatch = false;
  for i in range(0,size):
    if (input [i] != password[i]):
        dontmatch = true;

return dontmatch;
```

```
def check_password(input):

  size = len(password);
  dontmatch = false;
  for i in range(0,size):
     dontmatch |= (input [i] != password[i])

  return dontmatch;
```

Real-world Crypto Code

from libsodium cryptographic library:

```
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
    d |= x[i] ^ y[i];
return (1 & ((d - 1) >> 8)) - 1;
```

Compare two buffers x and y, if match, return 0, otherwise, return -1.

Examples from Cauligi et al. FaCT: A DSL for Timing-Sensitive Computation. PLDI'19

Eliminate Secret-dependent Branches

- An instruction: `cmov_`
  - Check the state of one or more of the status flags in the EFLAGS register (`cmovz`: moves when ZF=1)
  - Perform a move operation if the flags are in a specified state
  - Otherwise, a move is not performed and execution continues with the instruction following the `cmov` instruction

Conditional Branches

```
if (secret) x = e

x = (-secret & e) | (secret - 1) & x


test secret, secret // set ZF=1 if zero
cmovz r2, r1 // r2 for x, r1 for e
```

More Conditional Branches

```
if (secret)
  res = f1();
else
  res = f2();
```

```
r1 ← f1();
r2 ← f2();
mov r3, r1
test secret, secret
cmovz r3, r2
// res in r3
```

Potential problems:

- What if we have nested branches?
- What if when `secret==0`, `f1` is not executable, e.g., causing page fault or divide by zero?
- What if `f1` or `f2` needs to write to memory, perform IO, make system calls?
- **Hardware assumption:** what if `cmovz` will be executed as soon as the flag is known (e.g., speculative execution)?

Memory Accesses

```
a = buffer[secret]
```

```
for (i=0; i<size; i++)
{
    tmp = buffer[i];
    xor secret, i
    cmovz a, tmp
}
```

- Performance overhead.
- Techniques such as ORAM can reduce the overhead when the buffer is large

An Optimization

- We can reduce the redundant accesses by only accessing one byte in each cache line.

```
for (i=0; i<size; i++)
{
    tmp = buffer[i];
    xor secret, i
    cmovz a, tmp
}
```

```
offset = secret % 64;
for (i=0; i<size; i+=64)
{
    index = i+offset;
    tmp = buffer[index];
    xor secret, index
    cmovz a, tmp
}
```

OpenSSL Patches Against Timing Channel



Fig. 1. Conventional (left) vs. scatter-gather (right) memory layout.

CacheBleed, an attack leaks SSL keys via **L1 cache bank conflict**.

Yarom et al. CacheBleed: A Timing Attack on OpenSSL Constant Time RSA.
https://faculty.cc.gatech.edu/~genkin/cachebleed/index.html

Arithmetic Operations

Subnormal floating point numbers





The Problem and A Solution



Rane et al. Secure, Precise, and Fast Floating-Point Operations on x86 Processors. USENIX'16

Constant-time ISA

- Some efforts:
  - ARM Data Independent Timing (DIT)
  - Intel Data Operand Independent Timing (DOIT)

ARM DIT: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ddi0601/2020-12/AArch64-Registers/DIT--Data-Independent-Timing
Intel DOIT: https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/best-practices/data-operand-independent-timing-isa-guidance.html

Constant-time under Speculation

- What problems arise?

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